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Abstract
We know little about the marine environment, particularly in the inhospitable Arctic region. Whereas 
national authorities often rely on the construction of a solid knowledge base to allow human activity 
access to new areas, scientists point to the impossibility of building comprehensive knowledge of 
subsea ecosystems. This paper presents an ethnographic study of a Norwegian oil and gas company’s 
development of a knowledge infrastructure for measuring the long-term trend of the behaviour 
of the marine environment, i.e. a baseline to be used as a reference to calculate potential risks in a 
commercially relevant Arctic area. The company’s infrastructuring mechanisms involve selecting and 
confi guring environmental sensing technologies, and tying them into the fabric of the company’s 
operational analysis routines. We identify and discuss how these mechanisms address and articulate 
temporal, spatial, and social tensions and how, in so doing, they mould new representations of 
environmental risk. 
Keywords: knowledge infrastructure, infrastructuring, environmental risk
Article
Introduction
November 2013. We are sitting in the offi  ce of an IT 
advisor in the research centre of a Norwegian oil and 
gas company. The advisor is leading the development 
of a web portal used by the company to display several 
real-time environmental parameters measured from a 
subsea observatory on the seafl oor off shore northern 
Norway. The data indicate the salinity, temperature, 
chlorophyll level, pressure, and depth of the water. There 
is also a graph representing the biomass concentration 
in the water column, which is updated every few minutes, 
and a video made from pictures over the last two days. 
These pictures are obtained using a camera placed next to 
a coral reef. The IT advisor has an Internet browser open 
on one of his two PC screens and an instant messaging 
program on the other screen. While explaining something 
to us, he is suddenly distracted by the blinking of the 
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messaging program. One of the programmers working 
on the web portal wants his attention because “the fi sh 
is back”. The advisor turns to the browser, opens the web 
portal, and looks at the video frame, where a fi sh has just 
appeared in front of the subsea camera. It fl oats calmly, 
looking at the camera lens for a while, and fi nally leaves. 
The advisor explains that it is not the fi rst time that fi sh 
has behaved in that way. An analysis of the acoustic 
measurements previously indicated that that fi sh also 
speaks to the camera:
And that’s what happens, he gets really angry. 
So he says “Shshshshsh!” (…) Or maybe he 
gets annoyed. Maybe he gets used to it. And 
that’s also one of the things. Will we [have an] 
infl uence? Will the local fauna get used to the 
sounds when we do the stuff ? (Excerpt from 
fi eld notes)
A Norwegian research magazine was recently 
titled “We know the moon better than the seabed” 
(Haugan, 2015). In this paper, we tell a story of 
infrastructuring a baseline of the seabed. We 
recount of a project by a Norwegian oil and gas 
company (NorthOil, a pseudonym) to perform 
real-time environmental monitoring in the sub-
Arctic marine ecosystem off  the coast of north 
Norway (Venus, a pseudonym). Venus is estimated 
to be rich in petroleum resources but is the only 
portion of the Norwegian continental shelf 
(NCS) where oil and gas operations are currently 
banned. NorthOil’s goal is to build an approach 
to continuously survey several environmental 
parameters in order to obtain a robust baseline, 
i.e. a reference long-term trend of the behaviour 
of the Venus ecosystem. This approach could put 
NorthOil in a better position to obtain permission 
to operate in the event of a future opening.
NorthOil’s initiative is motivated by the 
Norwegian government’s promotion of a knowl-
edge-based approach for making decisions that 
can potentially affect the environment (NME, 
2009). This technocratic perspective implies 
monitoring environmental parameters over a 
long period to obtain a baseline, but it remains 
uncertain whether it might lead to robust 
knowledge and thus to input for risk assessment. 
The situation is complicated by heated political 
and scientifi c debates around the uncertainties 
associated with the environmental impact of oil 
and gas offshore operations. Scientific institu-
tions have particularly criticised the knowledge-
based approach for its shortcomings, arguing 
that comprehensive risk assessment is ultimately 
impossible: 
[U]ncertainty cannot fully be quantifi ed when 
facing ignorance – what we do not know, and even 
further: what is beyond our conception of what is 
possible. (Hauge et al., 2014: 87) 
Subsea environmental monitoring practices 
within the oil and gas sector are not new, but 
they are usually confi ned to annual or triennial 
sampling campaigns conducted by external 
consultants. Datasets are normally sparsely stored 
in disconnected data silos with data analysis 
trailing data collection by months or even years. 
What makes NorthOil’s strategies different is 
that they consist of a combination of tightly 
interacting remote sensors, desktop systems, 
risk representations, and work processes. For 
the newly acquired capacity of NorthOil to have 
organisational uptake, the strategies draw on 
existing operational routines, but they must be 
adapted to a domain that is largely unknown to 
the oil and gas sector. What becomes apparent, 
then, is an eff ort of innovation and experimen-
tation at the fringes between operation-based 
monitoring and long-term environmental moni-
toring. At these fringes, our (non-)knowledge of 
the marine ecosystem is translated into numeric 
trends that must be understood by an oil and 
gas audience. We therefore want to enquire into 
this moment: How is uncertainty about the marine 
environment quantifi ed into a baseline of environ-
mental behaviour? How are the emerging tensions 
addressed in practice?
Studies into the problem of long-term data 
collection and curation demonstrated how data 
are constructed and never result from uncontested 
processes (Borgman et al., 2012; Ribes & Jackson, 
2013; Steinhardt & Jackson, 2014): the very defi ni-
tion of ‘data’ hides invisible actors and values on 
technical, practical, and political grounds (Bowker, 
2000; Bowker & Star, 1999; Gitelman, 2013). The 
literature in Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) has successfully treated cases where data 
are produced through localised practices – even 
when they are part of larger arrangements. We 
present a case where the problem of building 
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a long-term trend of environmental behaviour 
prior to and during an operational deployment (a 
baseline) prominently emerges from the interac-
tion between remote distributed measurements 
and the portfolio of corporate ICT, routines, and 
values (Edwards, 2010; see also Monteiro et al., 
2013). In so doing, we relate to and extend the 
literature in STS problematizing the co-evolution 
of knowledge infrastructure and its objects of 
interest (Bowker & Star, 1999; Ribes & Polk, 2015) 
and demonstrating that our knowledge of nature 
is inextricably entangled with the infrastructure 
that we use to gather data about nature (Bowker, 
2000; Edwards, 2010). We specifi cally investigate 
how NorthOil is establishing a monitoring infra-
structure through three mechanisms: sensoring, 
the bricolage work towards the improvisation and 
adaptation of acoustic sensors to detect marine 
biomass; validating, the workarounds to ensure 
that measurements can be trusted and routines 
can be found to handle them; and abstracting, 
the pragmatic adjustments to make risk repre-
sentations appropriate to existing routines. These 
infrastructuring (Karasti et al., 2006; Star & Bowker, 
2002) mechanisms showcase the oscillation 
between local, real-time measurements in Venus 
and the need for the results to travel to be under-
standable and signifi cant across and outside the 
infrastructure over the long term. 
Even though NorthOil’s effort is directed at 
knowing nature in an undisturbed environment, 
it is still embedded in the oil and gas operational 
context and monitoring tradition. We show how 
the infrastructuring mechanisms modulate this 
embeddedness along the time, space, and trust 
dimensions. ‘Shshshshsh!’ is translated through 
the spatial and temporal framing performed 
through NorthOil’s knowledge infrastructure. This 
is, however, not enough for the fi sh’s voice to be 
heard. We further contribute by showing that the 
monitoring infrastructure must also be weaved 
into a careful work of social infrastructuring (cf. 
Bowker, 1994), based on techniques to build trust 
rather than consensus (cf. Barry, 2013). These tech-
niques are a purposeful mix of social networking 
with directly useful stakeholders, and of open 
data sharing to create momentum around the 
new infrastructure. We thus discuss the relation 
between infrastructuring and environmental risk 
perception and show that NorthOil’s mechanisms 
construct environmental risk as a public problem 
in a way that makes business sense in the context 
where NorthOil operates. We conclude that ‘Shsh-
shshsh!’ has a potential to mean diff erent things 
– or nothing at all – based on the political and 
economic context of infrastructuring.
Theoretical background
From uncertainty to risk quantifi cation
Social scientists have been interested in the rela-
tionship between uncertainty and risk quanti-
fi cation in terms of its political, economic, and 
social connotations (Beck, 1992; Jasanoff , 1999). 
Technical routines of quantitative risk assess-
ment always embed socio-political assumptions 
(Jasanoff, 1999). Consequently, risk is not an 
external object that can be measured; it is instead 
a refl ection of our (evolving) knowledge (Beck, 
1992). We rely on Latour’s (2003) interpretation of 
Beck’s concept of ‘risk’ as a network of distributed 
relations between social, technical, and natural 
elements. A vivid example is the case of the ‘mad 
cow’ disease:  
[Y]ou begin with a T-bone steak on your plate and 
you end up in the laboratory of a protein specialist 
showing you the tertiary structure of the now 
infamous prion (…) But in the mean time you have 
visited European Commission bureaucracies, the 
cattle farmers’ unions, quite a few hospitals, and 
participated in a lot of scientifi c meetings. (Latour, 
2003: 36)
In sum, defi nitions of ‘risk’ contain an inherent 
tension between global visibility and local condi-
tions that make it possible and measurable in 
practice (Latour 2003). Risk is constructed, it 
emerges through constant negotiations between 
what can be known, viz., sensed, represented, and 
valued. Currently, the translation of the uncer-
tainty into the language of risk management 
has become a constitutive feature of corporate 
governance, where the underlying idea is that 
well-governed companies are those that are able 
to handle risks properly (Power, 2007, p. 7; cf. 
Jasanoff , 1999): 
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Uncertainty is therefore transformed into risk when 
it becomes an object of management, regardless of 
the extent of information about probability. 
This is certainly the case when we speak of envi-
ronmental risk. However, scholars in the fi eld of 
marine policy, notably, those from the Norwegian 
Institute for Marine Research (IMR), have argued 
against the possibility of actually defi ning and 
quantifying environmental risk on an episte-
mological level (Blanchard et al., 2014; Hauge et 
al., 2014). Ecosystems are never unambiguously 
given, but the ‘facts’ that constitute a baseline of 
natural behaviour are constructed through cate-
gorisation processes and are fed into governance, 
which is often, in turn, driven by fi nancial reasons 
(Knol, 2013). 
Several studies in marine policy also empha-
sised the networked nature of environmental risk 
assessment (Blanchard et al., 2014; Hauge et al., 
2014; Knol, 2013). A complex relationship exists 
between socio-political choices and their envi-
ronmental consequences. Some authors have 
stressed the need to investigate this relationship 
in terms of the uncertainties associated with the 
side eff ects of routine operations rather than with 
major accidents, such as large oil spills (Blanchard 
et al., 2014). This perspective opens the black box 
of the connection between the less visible details 
of quantitative risk assessment procedures and 
how knowledge emerges: the former can restrict 
the debate on the issues and uncertainties that are 
considered relevant when deciding the scope of 
risk assessment, the methodologies, and the pres-
entation of results (Hauge et al., 2014). Crucially, 
then, our perception of environmental risk is infl u-
enced by risk assessment methodologies: 
All these choices are value-laden because they 
have the potential to infl uence perceptions on 
what is at risk, how high the risk is, and what ought 
to be done with regard to the issue. (Hauge et al., 
2014: 88)
To summarise, the analysis of the process of 
feeding uncertainty into risk requires a theoret-
ical concept able to account for the networked 
and long-term dynamic relations between social, 
technical, and natural elements. We believe that 
this problem should be addressed as one of 
knowledge infrastructure.
From knowledge production to knowledge 
infrastructures
Our knowledge inevitably depends on the 
apparatus that we use to know the world (Barad, 
2003) and co-evolves with it (Bowker, 2000). The 
data that we collect and that constitute the base of 
our knowledge are always cooked, never entirely 
raw: “Raw data is both an oxymoron and a bad 
idea. On the contrary, data should be cooked with 
care” (Bowker, 2005: 184). For STS researchers it is 
important to look “under the data”, at the practices 
to produce rather than discover knowledge 
(Gitelman, 2013), by investigating empirically 
how techniques for data collection and curation 
become constitutive of scientifi c facts (Bowker 
& Star, 1999; Chang, 2004; Pinch & Bijker, 1984). 
Ribes and Jackson (2013) describe the non-heroic 
workarounds of sampling and measuring river 
water quality while also balancing concerns about 
the long-term usability and readability of the 
data for future research. Bowker and Star (1999: 
36) illustrate what this perspective entails: “While 
pregnant cow’s urine played a critical role in the 
discovery and isolation of reproductive hormones, 
no historian of biology had thought it important 
to describe the task of obtaining gallons of it on 
a regular basis”. Scientifi c data curation is often 
the result of collaborative routines, which strictly 
depend on the members trusting the value of each 
other’s data because what counts as data to one 
scientist might be context to another (Borgman et 
al., 2012). Often diff erent temporal perspectives 
drive the scientists’ daily work practices. Stein-
hardt and Jackson (2014) focus on the alignment 
work to bend diff erent temporal perspectives to 
accommodate the activities of diff erent groups. 
Observing how rhythms are prioritised gives us 
an understanding of otherwise invisible rela-
tional dynamics. The spatial dimension of data 
production also deserves attention. In a case 
from a domain similar to ours, Almklov and Hepsø 
(2011) describe how mismatching interpretations 
of petroleum reservoirs are generated by geolo-
gists and geophysicists, who are accustomed to 
examining geological sedimentation in opposite 
directions, the latter from the top (by reading 
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electric logs) and the former from the bottom (by 
studying rock layers).
In sum, these studies have shed light on the 
material enactment of data, front-staging issues 
of trust (Borgman et al., 2012), time (Steinhardt 
& Jackson, 2014), and space (Almklov & Hepsø, 
2011). They have successfully demonstrated how 
data construction is part of a larger arrangement 
of communities and information tools, but data 
acquisition often has a situated character: e.g., a 
point in a river stream (Ribes & Jackson, 2013) or a 
pregnant cow (Bowker & Star, 1999: 36). NorthOil’s 
approach to data construction is peculiar because 
it is only made possible through an ecology of 
distributed devices and systems, each with a 
diff erent origin and genesis, made to interoperate 
through the constant and not necessarily always 
successful work of maintenance, upgrades, and 
adaptation (Edwards et al., 2013;  Monteiro et al., 
2013). We thus supplement the fi ndings of the 
literature reviewed above with those that explic-
itly focus on how the knowledge infrastructure 
matters to fact constructions. Relevant examples 
originate from heterogeneous fi elds, such as the 
petroleum industry (Bowker, 1994; Østerlie et 
al., 2012), energy provision (Silvast et al., 2013), 
climate science (Edwards, 2010), medical practice 
(Jirotka et al., 2005) and research (Ribes & Polk, 
2015), and environmental research (Karasti et al., 
2006; Karasti et al., 2010). Some of these studies 
investigate the evolution of infrastructures by 
observing the work to balance immediate and 
situated needs with the uncertainties associated 
with long-term and global constraints (Karasti et 
al., 2010; Ribes & Finholt, 2009). To embrace the 
evolving and unstable nature of infrastructures, 
Star and Bowker (2002) used ‘infrastructure’ as 
a transitive verb. Thus, the term infrastructuring 
(Karasti et al., 2006) was introduced to refer to the 
refl exive strategies of designers and users to make 
infrastructure fl exible to meet tensions and antici-
pate future problems. Infrastructuring avoids 
clear-cut categories of system development, use, 
and maintenance where infrastructure evolution 
does not quite fi t. 
Nevertheless, our knowledge still crucially 
depends on the experience in a local context 
(Zimmerman, 2008). Edwards (2010) describes 
the making of a climate science infrastructure as a 
matter of simultaneously conducting local meas-
urements into planetary climate data networks 
and processing dirty datasets into consistent and 
readable representations. Hence, the making of 
imperfect data models has a fundamental role 
in constituting reality, rather than describing it. 
NorthOil’s experimentation unfolds along a similar 
vein. A methodological perspective to tackle the 
tensions generated by infrastructure evolution 
involves inverting the infrastructure. Infrastruc-
tural inversion is similar to a ‘pair of glasses’ for the 
actors in the fi eld as well as for the researcher to 
move the focus from situated instances of tech-
nology development towards the continuous 
articulation work to upgrade and maintain the 
infrastructure (Bowker, 1994; Bowker & Star, 1999; 
Edwards, 2010). Inversion is a powerful tool for 
looking “under the data” and exposing the inner 
mechanisms of infrastructuring knowledge 
production. For the actors, inversion is a genera-
tive resource to “reinterpret the status quo of infra-
structure in light of potentialities, thus paving the 
way for embedding new tools in particular ways” 
(Kaltenbrunner, 2014: 19).
In the case of NorthOil, however, old habits and 
practices die hard. Partly because of a focus on 
safety, oil and gas operations are fairly conserva-
tive and slow to adapt. Against this backdrop, 
ongoing experimentation to create an environ-
mental risk-monitoring infrastructure creates 
space and opportunities to explore how environ-
mental risk will be rendered for heterogeneous 
audiences; on the other hand, it also presents 
challenges in terms of the appropriation or institu-
tionalisation of tools, practices, and formal proce-
dures. 
Case
The NCS and the uncertainties of environ-
mental monitoring
The waters off  the coast of Norway are home to 
the world’s largest population of a species of cold-
water coral called Lophelia pertusa (Fosså et al., 
2002). The corals are centres of complex marine 
ecosystems, where fi sh and other marine species 
seek shelter and food (Costello et al., 2005; Figure 
1). The waters off the Lofoten and Vesterålen 
Islands in north Norway (Venus) host some of the 
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world’s largest stocks of fi sh, particu-
larly cod and herring, which migrate 
there from the Barents Sea to spawn. 
Their eggs and larvae later drift back 
towards the Barents Sea following the 
water currents (Hauge et al., 2014). In 
addition to the substantial economic 
interest in the region going back 
thousands of years, the coastline is 
scenic and attractive for both tourism 
and recreation. 
Since the discovery of hydro-
carbons in the North Sea in 1969, 
there has been constant controversy between 
fi shery and environmental concerns on the one 
hand, and oil and gas operations, on the other. 
Alongside this debate, the oil and gas sector in 
Norway has developed an intricate network of 
rigs, platforms, pipelines, vessels, and fi bre-optic 
cables to explore, extract, and produce resources. 
Currently, 78 oil and natural gas fi elds are active in 
Norwegian waters (MPE, 2014), which are home to 
thousands of wells (Figure 2). The socio-economic 
signifi cance of the oil and gas sector represents 
approximately 25% of the GNP (SN, 2014), is the 
largest export, employs approximately 15% of the 
non-public workforce, and has accumulated one 
of the largest governmental investment funds in 
the world.
The constant hum of controversy surrounding 
oil and gas operations in Norway is regularly 
accentuated by particularly antagonistic issues. 
The present issue of whether to allow oil opera-
tions in Venus, which is the richest fi shing ground 
in the country, is a perfect example of such contro-
versy (Blanchard et al., 2014; NME, 2006). The 
pressure to open the areas relates, among other 
things, to the estimate that approximately 24% 
of the world’s undiscovered oil and natural gas 
resources are hidden in the High North, above the 
Polar Circle (Hasle et al., 2009). Norway is one of 
the fi ve countries having territorial claims in those 
areas, which are characterised by harsh weather 
conditions and environmentally sensitive habitats. 
Little or sparse knowledge exists about the 
behaviour of these habitats and on the possible 
eff ects of oil and gas activities. The Norwegian 
Ministry of Climate and Environment has adopted 
a knowledge-based approach in its decision-
making processes. Its aim is to acquire a ‘reason-
able’ baseline for assessing the risks associated 
with human activity, including fi shing, tourism, 
and oil and gas operations (NME, 2009: Section 8): 
Figure 2. The Norwegian continental shelf, where 
the operational blocks assigned by the Norwegian 
government (grid) overlap with the environmental 
resources. Credit: MAREANO/Institute of Marine 
Research, Norway.
 
 
Figure 1. Fish swimming over a coral reef. Photo: 
MAREANO/Institute of Marine Research, Norway.
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Offi  cial decisions that aff ect biological, geological 
and landscape diversity shall, as far as is reasonable, 
be based on scientifi c knowledge of the population 
status of species, the range and ecological status 
of habitat types, and the impacts of environmental 
pressures. The knowledge required shall be in 
reasonable proportion to the nature of the case 
and the risk of damage to biological, geological 
and landscape diversity. 
In making a provocative statement to emphasise 
that there can be no ‘reasonable’ scientifi c back-
ground behind environmental risk assessment 
calculations, the IMR argued that “between 0 and 
100 per cent of a cohort of fi sh spawn can be lost 
in an oil spill” (Helgesen & Tunmo, 2009). Oil and 
gas companies have in turn criticised scientists for 
exaggerating precautionary considerations in the 
risk calculation process. 
Today, risk mitigation measures are generally 
used by oil and gas companies operating on the 
NCS in a reactive manner by following regula-
tions that were set in advance by authorities and 
politicians (Hasle et al., 2009). However, these 
regulations are often indefinite and general 
(Hauge et al., 2014). The Norwegian Directorate 
for Nature Management argued that the risk 
models developed for the areas off shore of north 
Norway are unable to account for local conditions, 
e.g., narrow fj ords, local currents, tides, and wind 
(Strand, 2014).
Disagreements about the possibility of turning 
the environment into baseline behaviour are 
due not only to spatial consideration but also 
to the observation that the environment does 
not respond to the same temporal scale of 
industrial activities. The time scale for off shore 
drilling engineers is seconds and minutes when 
responding to sensor-based pressure, torque, 
temperature and directional measurements. 
Companies seek an operational window that is 
as wide as possible while remaining constrained 
by the slow and formal decision hoops that every 
new technology must jump through in an oil 
and gas organisation. However, environmental 
trends and eff ects may only become visible over 
years, decades, or even centuries. The corals 
have existed on the NCS for at least 9,000 years. 
Pollution on fish spawning products becomes 
visible only in the next generation, when cod 
larvae could die after 3–4 years. Fish generations 
are the concern of fi shermen, who want to have 
knowledge about the present population and to 
ensure that there will be fi sh to catch in the subse-
quent seasons. When asked about the tension 
between a real-time approach to risk assessment 
and long-term natural changes, one NorthOil envi-
ronmental chemist wondered if it makes sense to 
frame the environment in human-constructed 
patterns:
That’s a potential paradox, of course, but I guess 
that the easy, the obvious answer is that (…) you 
need to start to monitor early (…) when you start 
doing what you could defi ne as a baseline, ‘cause 
then it’s not really a baseline. But then another 
existential question: Is there such a thing called 
ecological baseline? Is that possible? Because no 
environment is constantly… constant over the 
whole time.
The Venus observatory
NorthOil is the primary oil and gas operator in 
Norway. Founded in the early 1970s, the company 
was historically organised around a geographi-
cally local operational site. Currently, NorthOil is 
promoting the development of cross-disciplinary 
and cross-geographical infrastructures, which 
are supported by the installation of collaborative 
work technologies (e.g., SAP and Microsoft Share-
Point) and fi bre-optic Internet connections that 
allow for faster communication between off shore 
sites and onshore control centres.
Given the strategic location of Norway relative 
to the High North, NorthOil decided to start 
collecting oceanographic parameters halfway 
between the more familiar Norwegian Sea and 
the unwelcoming High North. In collaboration 
with marine research institutes and technology 
vendors, NorthOil installed an ocean observa-
tory in the mid-2000s on the seafl oor in the Venus 
area, approximately 20 km off  the Lofoten Islands, 
above the Arctic Circle. The observatory consisted 
of a metallic semi-conic structure equipped with 
a few off -the-shelf sensors to detect basic envi-
ronmental parameters such as sound, pressure, 
temperature, turbidity, chlorophyll, and fl oating 
biomass. A camera and a camera fl ash were placed 
on a 2-meter-high satellite crane to take pictures 
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of a coral reef that was selected by project partici-
pants. 
The project was considered successful and stra-
tegically relevant; therefore, it received funding 
in 2011 from the production and development 
department of NorthOil. In 2013, the observa-
tory was connected to the shore with a fi bre-
optic cable. Environmental data began to be 
fed into a publicly accessible web portal in real 
time (Figure 3). An environmental advisor from 
NorthOil summarised how they could use the 
data to demonstrate their ability to drill safely and 
increase the operational window as follows: 
We want to look at diff erent types and possible 
technologies or methods to get this done. (…) If we 
can argue that we can measure when the biomass 
comes, either when fi sh come or go or when the 
spawning products return, we can stop drilling on 
time before the products return.
NorthOil was interested in using real-time data to 
fi nd a correlation between the time of year and 
the marine biomass concentration (fi sh, eggs, and 
larvae). By analysing the trends over several years, 
a threshold value could be obtained to indicate 
the beginning and end of the spawning season. 
Therefore, the operational window could be set 
outside this interval.
Figure 3. The Venus web portal. ‘Biomass indicator’ is the environmental value (reproduction by the authors with 
www.Balsamiq.com). Photos: MAREANO/Institute of Marine Research, Norway.
 
Research method
This paper is the result of a longitudinal ethno-
graphic study conducted within NorthOil. Even 
in the traditionally open Scandinavian environ-
ment, access to an oil and gas organisation is 
not straightforward for external researchers. The 
fi rst author was granted a pass to NorthOil’s R&D 
department through one member of our research 
team who also holds a full-time senior position at 
NorthOil and has a history of collaboration with 
the second author. 
Beginning in April 2012, the fi rst author spent 
an average of 2–3 days per week for two years at 
the fi eld site. She was initially granted a desk at 
the entrance of the department, where projects 
related to environmental monitoring were 
happening. However, sitting next to the entrance 
is equivalent to having a ‘guest’ label. Not all infor-
mation is shared with guests. As the researcher 
began to take part in some meetings and to 
follow a few informants to coff ee breaks and lunch 
breaks, the employees became more accustomed 
to her presence. In November 2012, the head of 
the section, who initially granted the researcher 
a badge, also allowed her to use a desk in an 
open-space offi  ce shared with key participants 
in NorthOil’s real-time environmental monitoring 
programs.
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Along with this physical vicinity, access to 
information was greatly increased. Corpora-
tions today often hire ethnographers to collect 
qualitative data on the functioning of daily work 
(Hepsø, 2013). This habit makes the subjects in 
the fi eld more comfortable with being observed, 
but it does not guarantee an easier life for 
external personnel. To blend with informants, the 
researcher regularly went to the offi  ce on days 
dedicated to fi eldwork at approximately 8:30 and 
left after 16:00, as did other employees. Together 
with the constantly visible NorthOil badge, this 
approach allowed the researcher to intermingle 
with the people who were working in the depart-
ment. In fact, she was sometimes mistaken for 
a full-time employee. She was often invited to 
meetings, workshops, and teleconferences with 
external partners and technology vendors and 
with other NorthOil offi  ces located elsewhere in 
the world. Observations have been continuous 
(producing hundreds of pages of fi eld notes) and 
fundamental for identifying internal documenta-
tion (reports, presentations, and deliverables) and 
informants to interview.
Semi-structured interviews (33 in total) were 
initially conducted with NorthOil representa-
tives and later with representatives from other 
companies that were collaborating with NorthOil, 
namely nine environmental advisors from a 
company active in risk assessment and quality 
certification and one project manager from a 
technology vendor company. We travelled a few 
times by plane to personally interview people 
located in other Norwegian cities. The second 
author could also participate in several events and 
in the interview process. Data collection occurred 
regularly until April 2014. Henceforth, the fi rst 
author has only occasionally visited the NorthOil 
R&D department to conduct short follow-up 
discussions regarding the themes emerging from 
the data analysis process.
The data analysis proceeded in parallel with 
data collection and was aided by a discussion 
between the two authors and with the members 
of the research group. In line with an interpretive 
tradition stemming from the fi eld of Information 
Systems (Klein & Myers, 1999; Walsham, 1995), we 
relied on several iterations to make sense of the 
empirical data. Initially guided by our research 
question, we searched for practical mechanisms 
with which to build a baseline of the unknown 
subsea environment in Venus. The iterative 
analysis guided our attention to shift from the 
artefacts (web portals, sensors, and subsea obser-
vatories) to the infrastructures that sustain these 
artefacts across space and time (Edwards et al., 
2013; Monteiro et al., 2013). In doing so, we opera-
tionalised an infrastructural inversion (Bowker, 
1994), which has influenced our data access, 
collection, and analysis strategies. However, this 
approach tends to leave its dynamics under-
specifi ed, particularly when the investigation of 
infrastructure is primarily in the hands of a single 
researcher for a limited number of years. For 
example, how could we understand the way the 
eff ort of building a new knowledge infrastruc-
ture is concerned with problems of accessing the 
sea fl oor? How could we know about NorthOil’s 
existing routines for handling real-time datasets? 
Following the suggestions of Ribes (2014) and 
Beaulieu (2010), we identifi ed key relevant actors 
in the fi eld and aligned with them because we 
realised that they sought to answer the same 
questions that we were. This strategy was facili-
tated by our increasing familiarity with the actors. 
As a result, we were sometimes asked for feedback 
or for help with small tasks in the Venus project 
(e.g., commenting on a draft document). 
Findings: Three 
infrastructuring strategies 
The literature identifi ed a number of concerns 
associated with the processes of data collec-
tion and maintenance, such as data sampling 
(Ribes & Jackson, 2013), long-term curation 
(Karasti et al., 2006), and validation and modelling 
(Edwards, 2010). We identifi ed three similar diffi  -
culties encountered by NorthOil: (1) establishing 
routines to generate measurements of the marine 
ecosystem; (2) investigating existing standardised 
mechanisms to validate the trustworthiness of the 
datasets collected in unmanned locations; and (3) 
attempting to abstract the datasets into general 
representations of environmental risk that make 
sense for the oil and gas professionals. We call the 
strategies enacted by NorthOil to overtake these 
diffi  culties infrastructuring mechanisms because, 
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more prominently than other examples in the 
literature, they are only made possible through 
the infrastructure as a whole. At the intersection 
between environmental monitoring and oper-
ation-based monitoring, these infrastructuring 
strategies encompass phases of selection and 
design, installation, adaptation, and use, and result 
in an amalgam of institutionalized and new infor-
mation systems, devices, routines, and locations. 
As we shall see, these mechanisms encapsulate a 
range of infrastructural concerns inside the repre-
sentations of risk for the marine resources.
Sensoring
The monitoring of the subsea environment over 
the long term – viz. outside daily operations such 
as drilling and producing – is not a core activity 
for oil and gas companies. NorthOil and its 
partners took inspiration from actors with estab-
lished experience on and in the sea, primarily 
fi shermen and external marine research institu-
tions, including the IMR. The adaptation of their 
technologies to the Venus project, however, soon 
gave birth to new situated problems. 
The sensors installed on the observatory were 
rather inexpensive off -the-shelf devices. Particu-
larly signifi cant were the active acoustic devices 
such as echo sounders. In principle, echo sounders 
send an acoustic pulse at fi xed intervals (shorter 
than 1 s) and measure the strength of the signal 
returned when a target is hit within its audible 
range, which depends on predefined settings 
and on the speed and direction of the water 
current. In general, these instruments can be used 
to determine the size of the targets in the water 
column, such as fi sh, fi sh eggs, larvae, or even 
zooplankton. 
A fi rst challenge for the Venus project was that 
targets as small as zooplankton or fi sh larvae and 
eggs were almost impossible to locate because 
they are smaller than the wavelength of the echo 
sounders available to the Venus project. As a 
consequence, computer models simulating the 
dispersion of eggs and larvae drifting along with 
the water currents were integrated to obtain the 
missing data. A marine biologist from a company 
collaborating with NorthOil described this 
challenge: 
One example is that we want to monitor larvae and 
eggs drifting through the bottom masses; but (…) 
[w]e know [that the Venus ocean observatory] is 
not able to monitor that. So what do we do then? 
(…) The equipment will be better in a few years 
perhaps, ‘cause we know that there are organisms 
that are vulnerable to oil pollution, much more 
vulnerable than adult fi sh, that can swim away from 
the oil, but [larvae can’t].
A second challenge related to the positioning 
of the acoustic sensors. These instruments are 
typically installed on fi shermen’s boats and point 
downwards.
Placing the acoustic devices on the seafl oor 
means that the new measurements are obtained 
Figure 4. Approximate position of the 
swim bladder (top left) and exagger-
ated schematic representation of two 
directions used to spot fi sh (from the 
seafl oor or from a boat). The sound 
waves are often unable to spot targets 
smaller than their wavelength. Source: 
authors’ drawing. 
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from the bottom up rather than from the top 
down (Figure 4). This approach had an unpre-
dicted consequence because the way in which 
upward-looking data should be interpreted is 
not obvious. The most audible fi sh for an acoustic 
device are those that have a swim bladder, an 
internal organ located in the dorsal portion of 
some fish species that not only allows them 
to control their buoyancy but also to emit and 
receive sounds. These fi sh refl ect a stronger signal 
and are thus easier to spot, but the way that the 
swim bladder refl ects the signal depends on the 
orientation of the acoustic sensor. Given that time 
series collected by other research institutions 
or by fi shermen have generally been taken from 
the top down, the Venus data were not directly 
comparable with the historical datasets available 
to NorthOil and its partners. An environmental 
advisor from a partner company involved in 
NorthOil’s project summarises as follows: 
[A]nother problem about the [Venus project] is that 
the fi sh experts don’t have any experience about 
having the sensors from the bottom, that goes 
from the bottom. So they don’t know the echo 
actually from the [underbelly] of the fi sh.
In sum, the production of a long-term and global 
picture of the subsea life in Venus was struggling 
to cook its data and move past very situated issues 
involving spotting a fi sh, an egg, or zooplankton. 
Networking with the existing infrastructure of 
research institutions and fi shermen proved useful 
to produce – or to not produce – some initial 
measurements that, in their imperfection, began 
to draw the boundary between what constitutes a 
baseline of the marine ecosystem and what does 
not (e.g., small fi sh without a swim bladder).
Validating
Large-scale industry depends on predicta-
bility and quality assurance to run its business. 
Especially because the sensors were placed at 
unmanned subsea locations, the Venus datasets 
had to undergo validation steps. However, how 
can one quality-assure the environment? 
One solution involved rendering the environ-
ment in a format that fi tted industrial reporting 
routines. A few NorthOil members close to the 
Venus project decided to investigate the routines 
that the company adopts to handle real-time 
data during an oil and gas company’s daily opera-
tions, for example, when a new well is drilled. 
The idea was to borrow insights and to adapt 
those routines to the environmental domain. 
As is the case for many oil and gas companies, 
NorthOil has a dedicated support centre (called 
here Online Support Centre, or OSC) whose scope 
is to determine the technical quality of the data 
gathered by the service companies in charge 
of the drilling operations on behalf of NorthOil. 
The drilling of a new well is a delicate phase that 
must be carefully monitored to prevent accidents 
that can range from a stuck drill pipe that halts 
operations for a few days and causes the loss of 
huge amounts of money to more serious conse-
quences for the surrounding environment. 
However, knowing if things are going right or 
wrong is a challenging task when there is a lack 
of references against which to decide whether a 
given measurement respects the safety intervals. 
One OSC engineer stated that some errors can go 
completely unnoticed, generally due to sensor 
calibration: 
It could be that the data are shifted for some 
reason. Let’s say that the whole dataset coming in 
is 5 metres too deep or 5 metres too shallow. We 
wouldn’t be able to notice that (…) and that could 
be due to a calibration error to the sensor.
The OSC relies on both situated workarounds 
and standardised approaches to overcome 
these tricky issues. A typical approach involves 
trusting the vicinity of the off shore personnel to 
the measuring points because of their grounded 
knowledge of the site and the well. The same 
engineer continued as follows: 
[I]t is up to the data owners out in the asset 
because they know the formation, know they are 
supposed to hit this and that layer and so forth; 
they are fully responsible for the overall and the 
petro-physical quality of the data. And that requires 
a human to look at the screens and basically 
perform that type of checking.
Therefore, local experience of the site is a prereq-
uisite for data validation. The same is true when an 
Science & Technology Studies 29(1)
41
error is reported in an incoming dataset. Another 
OSC member echoed his colleague: 
[W]hen you have typically [Driller A] doing an MWD 
[measurement while drilling] and you have [Driller 
B] doing surface in the same rig, they are not doing 
the same depth references, so they are both wrong 
or both right. (...) But to really fi x this problem, 
you have to really get closer to the sensors, to the 
system, and you have to really fi x it off shore for 
every rig that is where you actually are solving it. 
And you need to monitor it and follow it up.
However, the OSC does not solely rely on the 
ability of off shore personnel to spot errors. Vali-
dation practices are also tied to economic incen-
tives. The centre has developed a complex system 
of penalty and bonus contracts to either penalise 
or award service companies based on their 
capacity to provide trustworthy datasets. It is a 
fl exible system because penalties or bonuses are 
directly proportional to the money that a service 
company earns for providing the datasets in each 
drilled section of a well. This approach is standard-
ised because the OSC applies it to all of its service 
companies and it stems directly from the contract, 
regardless of the details of the subsurface sensors. 
In a nutshell, money is directly linked to the 
technical quality of the datasets by increasing the 
bonus (or the penalty) as the drill bit nears the 
reservoir. This system triggers the development of 
better measurements from the service companies 
and indirectly becomes a metric for measuring the 
datasets delivered.
A review of the existing validating strate-
gies taught NorthOil’s environmental experts 
that the situated knowledge of the data collec-
tion site should be simultaneously ensured (thus 
leveraging on the experience developed when 
sensoring) and pragmatically tied to the company’s 
standards and economic parameters.
Abstracting
Even if data are technically sound, predicting 
the risk associated with oil and gas operations is 
often diffi  cult. Abstractions are necessary to cook 
the datasets further into a format that makes the 
possible risk for the environmental resources 
detectable and visible to the oil and gas profes-
sionals in the control room. We present two North-
Oil’s solutions to abstract risk representations for 
static (coral reefs) and moving marine fauna (fi sh).
The coral risk matrix. At the intersection 
between the oil and gas business and the envi-
ronmental domain, NorthOil adopted a coral risk 
assessment method engineered by a third-party 
environmental service company to predict the risk 
to coral reefs. One of the experts who designed 
the methodology summarised it as follows:
[W]e can express some kind of a risk to the 
operation (…). [W]e combined a probability 
based on the current measurements, and we have 
established a consequence matrix where we give 
the diff erent habitats a value. We implemented 
dispersion modelling into this, and when we 
combine it to this resource map, of course, we 
get a risk of confl ict between discharges and the 
resources. 
Because corals are static resources, surveyors tradi-
tionally identify and label them on a 2D map of the 
seafl oor. The map is subsequently overlain with a 
prediction of the particle plume that is generated 
during a planned drilling operation. Each coral 
structure is then mapped onto a ‘coral risk matrix’, 
based on the vicinity of each coral structure to 
the particle plume (Figure 5). The risk matrix is 
an adaptation of a general-purpose risk visualisa-
tion tool that represents corals as risk objects. The 
probability for a coral structure to be hit by the 
discharge plume (likely, large, moderate, or small) 
is evaluated against the consequences that the 
discharged particles may have on that structure 
(i.e., if the coral is healthy, the consequences will 
be severe; if it is dead, the consequences will be 
minor). Boundary values are set for each specifi c 
case in collaboration between third-party experts 
and the Norwegian authorities.
The coral risk matrix is finally included in a 
standard list of attributes describing a coral 
structure and is used to archive and compare the 
results of diff erent surveys. Because the coral risk 
assessment methodology has been adopted by 
the Norwegian Oil and Gas Association, the risk 
matrix has become an infrastructural element for 
operators who seek to locate safe drilling locations 
on the NCS.
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The environmental value. Assessing the risk 
associated with moving marine resources is not 
easy. A typical model for displaying the echo 
sounder measurements is the chromatogram, in 
which measurements are plotted over time and 
coloured in diff erent ways based on the concen-
tration of marine biomass at a given depth. A 
chromatogram for the area surrounding the 
Venus station was displayed on the Venus web 
portal (see Figure 3). In late 2013, a few members 
of the Venus project travelled to a small town in 
north Norway to present the Venus web portal to 
a local community of fi shermen. Positive feedback 
was received. A local newspaper wrote enthusias-
tically that the portal was becoming “More popular 
than the Disney Channel” (Figure 6). However, the 
fishermen also noted that the chromatogram 
was too densely populated for their purposes. 
In addition, the chromatogram’s granularity was 
deemed excessive by some environmental experts 
 
Figure 5. The coral risk matrix (reproduction by the authors).
Figure 6. Newspaper report on the workshop between NorthOil and the fi shermen. Title: “More popular than the 
Disney Channel. Now you can see reality TV from the seafl oor outside Bø. On Thursday, the ocean observatory 
of [NorthOil] and the Marine Research Institute was opened. It can also be useful for local fi shermen” (Erlandsen, 
2013, faces covered for anonymity).
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who were collaborating with NorthOil because 
the users of the analysed environmental trends 
want to receive results on a monthly basis; their 
databases are not ready for such detailed datasets. 
To overcome these diffi  culties, NorthOil and 
its partners took inspiration from the coral risk 
matrix. In so doing, they decided to synthesise the 
water column into a discrete set of values. Each 
of these values represented a biomass indicator 
that summarised the biomass concentration in 
larger chunks of the water column (Figure 3). The 
biomass indicator was then named an ‘environ-
mental value’, inheriting an earlier term from the 
Norwegian Directorate for the Environment1. The 
environmental value is obtained by collapsing a 
subset of the original sections scanned by the echo 
sounders into one; measurements are provided at 
hourly intervals instead of every few seconds. This 
strategy enhanced not only the visualisation but 
also the storing of data streams, generating drasti-
cally fewer data entries every hour. As presented 
during a 6-hour project meeting with representa-
tives from NorthOil and its partner companies, 
the environmental value has been defi ned by two 
participants as a 
[N]ewly cooked term… to express environmental 
happiness!
Upon closer inspection, the environmental value 
is the evolution of the risk matrix applied to 
moving marine biomass: 
[W]e want to do [the coral risk assessment] more 
generic, meaning that it can be used for other 
environmental resources as well (…) But you can 
also think of using the same method on the pelagic 
species like fi sh and things that swim around and 
move. (Environmental advisor)
However, adapting the coral risk assessment 
method to the fi sh revealed a hidden challenge: 
fish and marine biomass are continuously 
moving, meaning that the environmental value 
means diff erent things at diff erent moments and 
in diff erent locations. For example, two fi sh in 
usually deserted areas represent a high concen-
tration, whereas two fi sh in an otherwise densely 
populated location represent a low concentration. 
To collapse the unpredictability of nature into 
abstractions that work in an operational setting, 
the risk categories based on the environmental 
value must be calibrated with historical data, but 
such data are currently unavailable to NorthOil. In 
sum, abstracting mechanisms feed back into the 
sensoring and validating practices, which, in turn, 
shape the abstractions of the marine environ-
ment. 
Infrastructuring the sea 
into a baseline: Seeking 
environmental happiness? 
The fi sh quoted in the beginning sounds very 
annoyed. It repeatedly pops out of its coral shelter 
to speak to the camera. Is it really annoyed, after 
all? Or is it attracted to the camera? Our research 
question could be rephrased as follows: How does 
‘Shshshshsh!’ come to mean something for NorthOil 
in its long-term eff orts to gain permission to operate 
in Venus? The infrastructuring mechanisms that 
we have outlined serve to stage the voice of the 
fi sh as part of a measurable and repeatable play 
in NorthOil’s world (cf. Mol, 2002). NorthOil crafts 
a baseline despite limitations in the time-space 
sampling of data and the profound uncertain-
ties surrounding the possibility of gaining robust 
knowledge to feed risk assessment practices.
We build upon the literature reviewed above 
to convey the key message of this paper. First, 
“raw data should be cooked with care” (Bowker, 
2005). The fish’s voice is heard – or ‘cooked’ – 
through specifi c sensor confi gurations (sensoring) 
and processes to assess the incoming data as 
trustworthy (validating) and understandable 
(abstracting). Second, not only one hydrophone, 
but also an entire knowledge infrastructure is 
needed to translate the voice of the fi sh into a 
trend of the environmental behaviour of that 
portion of Venus. This process seeks to quantify 
the little knowledge that we have about a small 
submarine area into representations of ecosystem 
behaviour and embed them into the operations of 
a globally distributed oil and gas company. 
NorthOil’s case exposes the new infrastruc-
tural relations while they are accommodated at 
the boundary between the existing, operation-
based routine monitoring and the new possibili-
ties aff orded by a new space such as Venus. The 
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emerging tensions between oil and gas corporate 
processes and environmental (non-)knowledge 
cannot be solved because of the incommen-
surable nature of large-scale industry and the 
environment; whereas the fi rst is tied to predict-
able and routinized work processes to ensure its 
productivity, the latter does not fi t well into this 
type of system. As the environmental chemist 
quoted above commented, “no environment is 
constantly… constant over the whole time”. We 
observe NorthOil’s deployment of trust-building 
techniques to purposefully manage this unsolv-
able controversy and to mould the political 
dimension where the company is operating.
Three dimensions emerge from comparing our 
fi ndings with those of the literature presented 
above: space, time, and trust. Our case is novel 
because NorthOil is simultaneously changing 
the context and the machinery of data produc-
tion and curation along these three dimensions 
through an infrastructural inversion. 
Infrastructuring space and time
The purpose of embarking on environmental 
risk monitoring is to create a ‘global’ account in 
the sense that one assesses not only the specifi c 
measurements that are actually collected but also 
the risk of extended regions/areas or habitats (cf. 
Power, 1999). This purpose thus assumes quantifi -
cation to allow local measurements to travel and 
involves grappling with certain tensions that we 
discuss here (Porter, 1996). 
First, a spatial connection exists between the 
working method and the perspective that we 
have on certain phenomena (Edwards, 2010). 
Similar to Almklov and Hepsø (2011), although the 
drilling process necessarily occurs from the top of 
the well, the OSC must make sense of the online 
data stream from the bottom up. The same applies 
to the acoustic sensors deployed in Venus. Having 
originally been used on fl oating vessels, they are 
now turned upside down and made stationary, 
residing on the seabed. The data remain the same; 
however, the altered spatial perspective (from 
the bottom, not the top) simultaneously renders 
them diff erent. Reversing these spatial orders also 
emphasises the material dynamics involved in 
measurements. Acoustic signals collected at the 
bottom exhibit diff erent refl ections when they 
encounter a fi sh’s swim bladder. Global knowledge 
is made possible locally (Latour, 1999). When 
knowledge infrastructures are designed, this 
aspect must be carefully taken into account for its 
political meaning: the material relations between 
the infrastructure and the outside environment 
(e.g., sensors/swim bladders), if properly handled, 
have the potential to shape how risk is perceived 
outside (e.g., through the environmental value). 
NorthOil’s infrastructuring mechanisms have 
a generative potential in how they allow for the 
purposeful management of the interplay between 
global access to data and knowledge of the local 
processes of data acquisition (cf. Zimmerman, 
2008). For example, the Venus project partici-
pants had to learn how the echo sounders func-
tioned with respect to the swim bladder of some 
fi sh in the Venus area. The OSC bonus/penalty 
contracts must be complemented by the experi-
ences of off shore service companies related to 
subsea formations. At a fi rst glance, the coral risk 
matrix represents an outstanding exemplar of 
the creation of a contextual void. Such a simpli-
fi ed representation is also useful for comparing 
diff erent environmental surveys in a particular 
area at diff erent moments. As the world is reduced 
to inscriptions through measurements and simpli-
fi cations (“we give the diff erent habitats a value”), 
local knowledge can be amplifi ed (“we can express 
some kind of risk to the operation”). However, under 
scrutiny, the risk matrix does not exist in a vacuum. 
It embeds locally acquired expertise to assess 
what is a healthy coral reef and the experience 
needed to defi ne a safe distance from a drilling 
location. However, the strategies for tackling the 
local/global interface and achieving baseline envi-
ronmental data might follow diff erent dynamics if 
we consider other types of risk, such as climate 
change risks. In that case, risk calculations are 
primarily (but not entirely) performed at global 
scales, for example through climate models that 
are then adapted to the local setting (Edwards, 
1999, 2010). In the case of subsea environmental 
monitoring, the opposite is generally true: repre-
sentations such as the environmental value, are 
made ‘global’ but remain grounded in the histor-
ical data gathered at the local site. 
Second, NorthOil’s efforts are ostensibly 
about creating a knowledge infrastructure for 
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real-time data. What used to be an offl  ine, discon-
nected, and slow practice in which risk was often 
assessed in an ex-post manner has suddenly 
become fast, interconnected, and closely visible. 
This shift occurs by balancing the years during 
which the environmental trends become clear 
and the seconds that the technology uses to 
measure them. Different conceptions of time 
must be frozen into diff erent enactments of risk 
that make sense to the diff erent stakeholders that 
are involved. However, a variety of incommen-
surable time scales exists, all of which are imbri-
cated with distinct materiality (Ribes & Finholt, 
2009; Steinhardt & Jackson, 2014). The starting 
point is a system such as the bonus/penalty 
contract used by the OSC. The formulation of this 
contract enacts risk as an economic risk for the 
service company. If we unpack the contract, it is 
a compromise between the months and years 
required by formal governance and the seconds 
with which drilling engineers operate. Similarly, 
the enforcement of the risk matrix by the Oil and 
Gas Association led it to acquire an infrastructural 
quality that intersects the oil and gas and environ-
mental domains. It represents a trade-off  between 
the temporality of risk to the coral reefs (damage 
might become visible over the course of several 
decades) and what constitutes risk to operations 
(being stopped, which is visible in only a few 
seconds). In extending the matrix, the environ-
mental value was developed by adding one step 
not only to create real-time monitoring machinery 
but also to make it dynamic. Because no opera-
tions are currently permitted in the Venus region, 
the environmental value constitutes an indirect 
measure of risk and computes in a few seconds 
the historically relative amount of marine fauna 
that could potentially be aff ected. 
This new real-time/long-term scenario intro-
duces new ways of assessing the risk associated 
with present or future oil and gas activities. As a 
consequence, it dramatically shuffles and ulti-
mately reduces the temporal gap between human 
operations and their possible consequences. 
In analysing how risk emerges as a phenom-
enon, we should be specifi c about the agency of 
the material elements because, if the feedback 
loop between an action and its consequences is 
shortened, the generative role of the combined 
materiality of nature and technology gives birth 
to new and unprecedented results. 
Trust infrastructuring 
We suggest that future STS research could pay 
more attention to the way infrastructures are 
“constructed as a public problem in specifi c imagi-
native spaces of opportunity and closure” (Schick 
& Winthereik, 2013: 82; Jirotka et al., 2005). Infra-
structures always inscribe a political address in 
the way technologies are confi gured to represent 
specific possibilities of modernity and future 
(Larkin, 2013). Barker (2005) describes how that 
happened in Indonesia, where satellite technology 
was infrastructural to build a sense of national 
self in the country through the daily work of 
engineers. NorthOil’s strong but contested polit-
ical-economic position in the Norwegian context 
led the company to invest in becoming infrastruc-
tural to the construction of environmental risk in 
Venus as a public problem for specifi c audiences. 
The infrastructuring mechanisms described 
above are thus complemented by a subtle but 
continuous application of techniques of social 
networking and openness – a combination that 
is not often registered in the infrastructure litera-
ture. Interestingly, these strategies are directed 
towards building trust rather than consensus with 
the potential stakeholders of NorthOil’s infrastruc-
ture, including fi shermen, research institutions, 
and the general public (Shapin & Schaff er, 1985; 
Yearley, 2009). In other words, NorthOil is opening 
a space of mutual respect about the means for 
rather than the ends of real-time environmental 
monitoring. For example, the a priori antagonistic 
relationship between fi sheries, the environment, 
and petroleum operations has not and most 
likely will not result in a consensus. Instead of a 
stand-off  awaiting consensus, “[in] the presence of 
antagonism…decisions often have to be arrived 
at…in the face of persistent disagreement” (Barry, 
2013: 7).
Bowker (1994) highlights the importance of 
building an onshore ‘social infrastructure’ that 
mirrors the technical subsea infrastructure. Let 
us consider two public risk representations 
developed within the Venus project: the chroma-
togram and the environmental value. They are 
associated with NorthOil’s careful work of social 
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infrastructuring around the specifi c problem of 
subsea environmental risk, for which no closure 
has been reached in public debates. This aspect 
shows how the relationship between data and 
data perception is inextricably connected to 
mutual trust (Yearley, 2009: 158). Conveying the 
message that the Venus web portal – used to 
display the environmental value and the chro-
matogram in real time – is better than the Disney 
Channel lessens the tensions generated by 
everything related to oil and gas – not only with 
the fishermen to whom the presentation was 
addressed but also with the newspaper readers. 
This message resonates with the defi nition of envi-
ronmental value as a “measure of environmental 
happiness”. This mechanism also occurs in the 
context of the more traditional drilling operations, 
where measurements are often conducted by one 
or more service companies. Incomprehension 
happens when the OSC lacks a reference to service 
company measurements and when “they are not 
doing the same depth references, so they are both 
wrong or both right”. To quote the OSC engineer, 
“if you don’t trust the data, you don’t use the data, 
and some shit happens”. It is true that “the ability to 
comprehend data collected by others…is the key 
to their use” (Zimmerman, 2008: 648), but trusting 
how third parties perform the work (rather than 
why) is a necessary condition for trusting the data 
that they produce (Borgman et al., 2012). What 
diff ers in Venus is that measurements are collected 
in a non-operational area, where no direct oil and 
gas interests can be claimed. This aspect under-
lines the second relevant feature of NorthOil’s 
trust infrastructuring mechanisms: openness. 
The Venus real-time data are shared through a 
colourful publicly accessible web portal. On the 
one hand, the absence of operational data and 
the openness of the portal enforce the genuine 
impression of the Venus project and shadow its 
business-related character. On the other hand, 
given how little we know about the Arctic sea 
fl oor, these features are a strategy to enrol collab-
oration from external research institutions that 
might not agree with NorthOil’s motivations, but 
crave datasets to develop a better knowledge of 
the marine ecosystem.
NorthOil’s approach to building trust shows 
that infrastructural inversion has an economic 
thrust. Some within NorthOil argue that openness 
is in particular a prerequisite for achieving cred-
ibility, including in cases of legal liabilities, with 
governmental agencies. However, one of our 
informants noted that the current strategy of 
openness might be discouraged when/if the 
uncertainty about the environment is quantifi ed 
into measurable economic concerns:
There is not so much profi t involved [in 
environmental data]. For the moment!
Conclusions: The politics of risk
We probably still know the moon better than 
we know the seabed. We reported on NorthOil’s 
strategies to overcome this status of non-knowl-
edge in the Arctic marine environment and to 
establish a baseline of the marine ecosystem 
behaviour to assess operational risk. We followed 
the data construction process across a knowledge 
infrastructure-in-the-making and analysed how 
uncertainty about the marine environment is 
quantified into a knowledge base by carefully 
leveraging cross-infrastructure spatial, temporal, 
and socio-political tensions. Infrastructuring high-
lights the continuous, interacting, and distrib-
uted nature of NorthOil’s eff orts in an amalgam 
of design, development, and adaptation work. 
To support its infrastructuring strategy, NorthOil 
is investing in building a context of mutual trust, 
rather than consensus, with external stakeholders. 
Our case complements the infrastructure litera-
ture by showing that infrastructural inversion also 
consists of tuning strategies of social networking 
and open data sharing and, as such, has a key role 
in establishing trust. This observation invites us 
to refl ect on the politically charged character of 
‘facts,’ technologies, and numbers (Barry, 2013; 
Bowker, 2000). What can we make of the way in 
which the politics of risk unfold between the oil 
and gas world and environmental concerns? 
First, there are not only profound uncertain-
ties about environmental knowledge as we 
have described it: there are also ambiguities 
about what constitutes oil ‘operations’ and their 
consequences. The international newspaper 
The Guardian has initiated a campaign against 
providing financial support to companies that 
operate using fossil fuels2. The Venus area is 
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presently off  limits to oil drilling and production; 
however, the area is subject to seismic ‘surveys.’ 
Seismic surveys are conducted by shooting bursts 
of seismic sound-waves from long cables trailing 
vessels that are directed towards the seabed and 
then reading off  the echoes. As environmentalists 
have noted, these surveys are likely to be harmful 
to whales and other sea life, although nobody 
knows to what extent. One marine biologist, 
quoted in a Norwegian newspaper (Vegstein, 
2014), uses hydrophones to listen to the singing of 
sperm whales in the vicinity of Lofoten. She then 
detects the seismics from the ongoing “surveying”. 
Through the hydrophones, the seismics sound like 
“thunder” or “explosions” and cause the whales’ 
singing to subside: 
They tell us Lofoten is sheltered from oil operations. 
That is political bollocks. This ocean is severely 
aff ected. It is only that we cannot hear it [without 
hydrophones].
Second, it is not clear whether other oil and gas 
companies are interested in bringing possibilities 
for online and open environmental monitoring to 
the attention of the authorities. Traditionally, the 
operators have taken more of a back seat role. 
One of our informants told us that other operators 
were contacted about environmental monitoring 
initiatives, but they withdrew as they feared that 
they might be required to pay for and install 
new technologies. This point hides an important 
conception of the relation between infrastructure 
and power. NorthOil has larger competitors in the 
quest for subsurface resources in the Arctic, with 
stronger economic and political weight. Investing 
in similar technological innovation strategies 
would probably make less sense for them. North-
Oil’s infrastructuring mechanisms are weaved 
into the Norwegian context (e.g., the co-presence 
of a strong fi shery infrastructure) and NorthOil’s 
size. For NorthOil and its stakeholders to survive, 
it is important to sit where a specifi c future (e.g., 
real-time environmental monitoring) is being 
constructed thus where uncertainty is turned into 
a knowledge base. 
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Notes
1  See ‘Environmental values in Norwegian marine areas’ (http://www.havmiljø.no/) for additional details.
2 See http://www.theguardian.com/environment/series/keep-it-in-the-ground
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